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16 March 1965


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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, OSA

SUBJECT : 

Quoted below is a paragraph from a report on   
 Training at Stead AFB by Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall. Although written in 1955, a decade later this indecisiveness in providing proper leadership to combat personnel remains the primary weakness in this type of training. It is because of this vacuum that the Intelligence Division initiated the proposed replacement for Operational Policy Letter Number Six. It is felt that this background information may be of value to  in reviewing our proposed policy.

As previously stated, the school was initiated to serve SAC crews, and SAC remains its main customer. Since the school aims at realism in its instruction method, one of the critical pinches at the present time is the inability to tell SAC crews anything about what they would be permitted to say beyond name, rank, and serial number, in the event of capture. According to the faculty, SAC crews invariably seek more information on this point, and the fact that it cannot be given them is a cause of stress and complaint among the crews. The school's hands are tied in this matter, as, presumably, are the hands of higher authority, because of existing law and the unwillingness of authority at various levels to intrude on such delicate ground. This vacuum in instruction, nonetheless, reflects an indecisiveness in the most critical area which, if long protracted, will make nugatory much of the other effort at Stead Air Force Base. SAC crews are sufficiently aware of

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the fact that, if a major war should come, they will probably be the first to brace the main danger. But when they receive no answer to an important question, it must seem to them a signal lack of foresightedness in national preparation.

**SIGNED**

**E. D. DUCKETT, JR.**  
Chief, Intelligence Division  
Office of Special Activities

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